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rather than voidness,' to minimize the effect of defect in
marriage, would help to indicate that the answer to the
major query of this comment should be that the statute
does not make the forbidden marriages void, but rather
makes them, at worst, only voidable by proceeding and,
perhaps, not even that, but completely valid, although the
parties and their guilty accessories may be criminally punishable.
This last would seem to be the most decent and socially
desirable answer for the typical case, i. e., where by
perjury as to age the parties improperly secure a license,
go through a religious ceremony, and live together as husband and wife. It would be monstrous to say that such a
marriage could later be attacked, directly or collaterally,
or the legitimacy of the issue impugned. Rather, the better answer seems to be that, as under the older 18-21 statute, the forbidden marriage is valid, although the parties
are punishable.
It is regrettable that the statute was not more carefully
drafted so as to give a clear answer as to the legislative
intent on the point under discussion. 20 The known 2 ' existence of the analogous problem under the older 18-21 years
statute should have called attention to the need for explicit
solution of it in the new one.

LIABILITY

OF RAILROAD

TO INTRUDERS

CROSSING ITS RIGHT OF WAY
Jackson v. Pennsylvania R. Co.'
Plaintiff-appellant sought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when he was struck by a train of
defendant-appellee. The injuries were alleged to have been
received at night at a point where defendant-appellee's
tracks, which border a public thoroughfare in a thickly settled community in Baltimore County, were traversed by a
" Ibid; and consider also the Harrison case, supra n. 16.
20 Consider also the fault in the statute pointed out supra n. 3; and
the further point that the statutory provision withholding from the record
the certificate of pregnancy (in the exceptional situation under Section
7) is a futile one in view of the fact that it will be obvious that pregnancy
exists from the fact that the license issues to one under the statutory
minimum age.
21 As witness the discussion of the point in the REvIEW in 1937 and 1938
in the casenote and article cited, supra n. 7.
'3 A. (2d) 719, 120 A. L. R. 1068 (Md. 1939).
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well-worn footpath. Plaintiff-appellant's amended declaration alleged that he and the public generally had for
many years constantly, extensively, and notoriously used
this footpath to cross the tracks to the knowledge of and
without objection on the part of defendant-appellee. The
negligence alleged consisted of a failure to anticipate the
presence of plaintiff-appellant upon the tracks and a failure "to give reasonable adequate and timely warning
either by whistle, bell, lights, lookout or other signal", although the public generally, including plaintiff-appellant,
were accustomed and entitled to have such signals.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the amended
declaration and upon a refusal to amend further entered
judgment of non pros. against plaintiff-appellant in favor
of defendant-appellee for costs. On appeal, held: Affirmed. The declaration fails to disclose any breach of
duty owed to plaintiff-appellant and is defective upon demurrer.
The decision is noteworthy as indicating the continuing
tendency of the Maryland law to restrict the liability of a
landowner for unintended but serious harm to intruders2
upon his premises. The Maryland authorities' dealing
with the liability of a landowner toward those on his land
other than by invitation or inducement, in upholding the
sanctity of a landowner's premises and regarding intrusion thereon as wrongdoing, bear the heavy impress of the
ancient law of trespass as contrasted with the comparatively modern principles of the law of negligence.' In contrast to the Maryland dogma, as carried forward in the instant case, many, if not the majority, of the authorities
hold that under the facts pleaded in the instant case an
actionable case of negligence is stated.'
2 The term "intruders" is here used to mean those persons voluntarily
upon the land of another without the actual consent bf the latter, and in
whose visit he has no interest, but whose presence upon a more or less
limited area thereof is tolerated and may be reasonably expected.
I See authorities referred to infra, circa notes 12 to 33.
4"When
the comparatively modern law of negligence reached the relations of landowners to persons entering his (sic) property, it found the
field occupied by this concept of the owner's right as sovereign to do what
he pleased on or with his own property. The history of this subject is one
of conflict between the general principles of the law of negligence and the
traditional Immunity of landowners." Bohlen, Studies in the Law of
Torts, 163. See also, Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Re8pon8ibilitV in Tort (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495.
IThompson's Commentaries on Negligence (White's Supp.) See. 1726:
52 C. J. 555 et ff.; 20 R. C. L. 65, note It* Elliott on Railroads (3rd Ed.)
Vol. 8, Sec. 1647, notes 25-26,
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The basis of responsibility in such cases is not uniformly stated. The obligation of the railroad to exercise
care under such circumstances may be said to be based
upon an implied consent arising through acquiescence in
continued intrusion, or it may be held to arise as the legal
incident of the performance of dangerous acts which are
attended with the probability of serious injury.' It has
been suggested that the obligation should not be based
upon consent, but rather should be held to arise "from the
probability of injury so likely and so serious that public
policy requires that it be prevented even at the cost of
trenching upon the traditional privileges of landowners".'
Nevertheless, the consensual basis has played an important
role in the judicial solution of the problems presented by
such cases. Thus, it has been held by numerous cases that
the acquiescence of the railroad company for a long
time in the crossing of its tracks by pedestrians at a definite place amounts to a license and permission to cross the
tracks at that point, and the railroad company thereby
obligates itself to assume the duty of exercising reasonable care to prevent injury by reason of its operation to
those who cross its tracks.' A number of decisions have
held, in situations varying somewhat from that of the instant case, that an invitation will be implied under certain
circumstances from acquiescence in or toleration of habitual trespasses upon railroad property.' It has been said
that there is no true consent in these cases, and that to the
extent that possessors of land have been held liable to
tolerated intruders for harm caused by conduct not wilful
or wanton the duties owed to trespassers have been extended by the device of calling them licensees or invitees. 10
However, other courts have disdained this technique and
held that regardless of the status of the intruder, one engaged in an activity attended by great danger is required
to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring another when
Green, op. cit. supra n. 4, 516; Bohlen, op. cit. supra n. 4, 62.
Bohlen, op. cit. supra n. 4, 179.
Barry v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.. 92 N. Y. 289 (1883); Cahill v. Chi..
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 7), 74 F. 285 (1896); Clampit v. Chi., St. P
& K. C. Ry. Co.. 84 Iowa 71, 50 N. W. 673 (1891) ; Oregon-Wash. R. & Nay.
Co. v. Roman (C. C. A. 9). 293 F. 666 (1923) ; Felton v. Aubrey (C. C. A.
6), 74 F. 350 (1896)
Lodge, et al.. v. Pittsburgh & L. R. R. Co., 243 Pa.
10, 89 A. 790 (1914) ; Erie I. Co. v. Burke (C. C. A. 2), 214 F. 247 (1914)
Jones v. Southern Ry. Co., 199 N. C. 1, 153 S. E. 637 (1930).
Pomponio v. N. Y. etc. R. Co., 66 Conn. 528, 34 A. 491 (1895) ; Cederson
v. Oregon Navigation Co., 38 Or. 343, 62 P. 637 (1900), 63 P. 763 (1901):
Missouri Pae. R. Co. v. English, 187 Ark. 557, 61 S. W. (2) 445 (1933).
10 Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers (1937) 12 Temple L. Q. 32,
35-38.
8
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the presence of danger to such other person is reasonably
to be anticipated."
This realistic method of restating the common law as
to the liability of a landowner to a trespasser has been
adopted by the American Law Institute in Section 334 of
the Restatement of the Law of Torts. It is there said:
"A possessor of land who knows, or from facts
within his knowledge should know that trespassers
constantly intrude upon a limited area thereof, is
subject to liability for bodily harm there caused to
them by his failure to carry on an activity involving a
risk of death or serious bodily harm with reasonable
care for their safety."
A "Special Note" to Section 205 of Tentative Draft
No. 4 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts (which became Section 334 of the Final Draft) succinctly states the
objection to calling such intruders "licensees".
"Persons persistently committing trespasses, upon
a limited area, which the possessor does not go to the
trouble or expense of stopping, are ordinarily spoken
of as 'permissive licensees,' although the possessor has
plainly indicated his unwillingness to permit their
entry. Therefore, they cannot be 'licensees' as that
term is defined in Section 200."
The Maryland law with regard to the liability of landowners toward persons on their premises other than by invitation or inducement is of a conservative nature. Any
indications to the contrary existing in the Maryland decisions are believed to be the mere loose ends of an otherwise
tightly woven strand of immunity. Toward trespassers
who are unseen and of whose presence and peril the landowner is unaware, the landowner owes no duty except to
refrain from wilful or wanton injury. 2 There is no relaxation of this rule as respects infant trespassers. 18 The
1"Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Thompson (C. C. A. 9) 199 F. 395 (1912) ;
Dent v. Bellows Falls etc. Ry. Co.. 95 Vt. 523, 116 A. 83 (1922) ; Minot v.
Railroad, 73 N. H. 317, 61 A. 509 (1905) ; St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Donahoo,
82 Okla. 44, 198 P. 81 (1921); Ala. Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Guest, 144
Ala. 373, 39 So. 654 (1905): Gunn v. Felton, 108 Ky. 561, 57 S. W. 15
(1900) ; Troy v. Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley R. Co., 99 N. C. 298, 6 S. E.
77 (1888) ; Young v. Clark, 16 Utah 42, 50 Pac. 832 (1897).
12 Susquehanna Power Co. v. Jeffress, 159 Md. 465, 150 A. 788 (1930).
's Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 79 Md. 182, 28 A. 1065 (1894); State, use of
Alston, v. The Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., 4 A. (2d) 739 (Md.
1939).
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doctrine of attractive nuisance has never been applied in
Maryland. 4 However, awareness of the presence or peril
of a trespasser, imposes a duty upon the owner to exercise
reasonable care to protect him from the consequence of his
indiscretion.15 This seems to be the only basis, other than
wilful or wanton conduct, upon which liability may be imposed upon a possessor of land toward a trespasser thereon.16

Turning now to the liability of a landowner to those
upon his premises by permission, we find that the principal
Maryland cases in this field reflect the great respect that
has been accorded the opinion of Chief Justice Bigelow of
Massachusetts in the case of Sweeney v. Old Colony & Newport R. R. Co. 7 A distinction is there made between those
who enter the premises of another by invitation, enticement
or inducement, and those present by permission only. Toward the former a large measure of protection was accorded; 8 while the latter's position was no better than
that of a trespasser. 19 It has been suggested that the term
"permission" as used in the Sweeney case did not mean
true permission, but was used to describe "a failure to prevent the entry of intruders who are perfectly aware that
they are unwelcome, but whose intrusions were tolerated
because there was no reason to believe they could be prevented save by onerous and burdensome precautions".2
The classification of persons upon the land of another
adopted by Chief Justice Bigelow has been largely repu21 Grube v. Mayor
et!. of Baltimore, 132 Md. 355. 10.3 A. 148 (1918);
Mayor etc. of Baltimore v. DePalma. 137 Md. 179, 112 A. '277 (1920) ; State,
use of Lease, v. Bealmear, 149 Md. 10, 130 A. 66 (1925) ; State, use of Potter, v. Longeley, 161 Md. .563, 158 A. 6 (1932): State, use of Lorenz. v.
Machen, 164 Md. 579, 165 A. 695 (1933); State, use of Alston. v. The
Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., supra n. 13. See also, 36 A. L. R. 84.
15 But there is
no duty to exercise care to discover their presence and
peril. B. & 0. R. R. v. Welch. 114 Md. 536, 80 A. 170 (1911) ; 117 Md.
280. 83 A. 166 (1912) : 120 Md. 319, 87 A. 676 (1.913).
See also, B. & 0.
R. R. v. State, use of Savington, 71 Md. 590, 18 A. 969 (1889) ; Anderson
v. B. & 0. R. R., 144 Md. 571, 573, 125 A. 393 (1924).
11 Compare Restatement. Torts. Sees. 333 to 339. Some authorities regard the failure to exercise proper care after the discovery of the trespasser's presence and peril as wilful or wanton conduct. See Bohlen,
op. cit. supra n. 4, 168.
17 92 Mass. 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644 (1865).
The important influence of this
opinion generally is discussed by Professor Bohlen, op. cit. supra n. 4, 173;
and its influence upon the Maryland decisions is noted by Judge Thomas
in Burke v. Md.. D. & V. By. Co., 134 Md. 156. 161. 106 A. 353-354 (1919).
's "The possessor was required not only to conduct his activities with
reasonable care for the safety of his invitee, but also to exercise reasonable
care to provide a safe place for his reception." Explanatory notes to Section
1 9 202 Tentative Draft No. 4 of Restatement, Torts.
Ibid.
2o".bfd
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diated even in the State of its origin, and the landowner's
interest or lack of interest in the visit has become the criterion of the extent of his obligation to persons upon his
premises. 21 Thus the Restatement of Torts classifies those
present upon a landowner's premises as trespassers or licensees.2 2 For the purpose of distinguishing the duties
owed to various members of the latter class, it is subdivided into "gratuitous licensees" and "business visitors". 2 3
In like manner, and for the same purpose, "business visitors" are further subdivided into two classes: (1) "patrons", i. e., persons invited or permitted to come upon
the land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with
the business which the possessor conducts thereon; and (2)
"those who come upon the land for a purpose which is connected with their own business which itself is directly or
indirectly connected with any purpose, business or otherwise, for which the possessor used the land." 24 The distinction between invitation and permission is immaterial
2
in determining the extent of the possessor's obligation.
The term "permission" as used in the Restatement is entirely different in meaning from that term as it seems to
have been used in the Sweeney case.28
Several of the earlier Maryland cases will serve to illustrate the controlling importance which was accorded the
distinction and classification made in the Sweeney case.
Maesner v. Carroll,27 although not citing the Sweeney case,
adopts the same method of approach in a similar situation.
In B. & 0. R. Co. v. Rose 25 the Sweeney case was relied
upon to establish a right of recovery upon the theory of
invitation, allurement or inducement on the part of the
property owner. Permission was said to bestow no rights
in Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co.' which quoted copiously from the Sweeney case. Upon this foundation the
Maryland law developed, and the distinction between invitation or inducement on the one hand and permission or
Ibid, and see Bohlen, op. cit. supra u. 4, 174.
Restatement, Torts, Sees. 329, 330.
:'Jbid, Sees. 331, 332.
, Ibid, See. 332, Comment a.
2 Ibid, See. 330, Comment a.
28 See note 20, supra, and Restatement, Torts, See. 330, Comment b.
2746 Md. 193 (1877).
2865 Md. 485, 4 A. 899 (1881).
"77 Md. 535, 26 A. 973 (1893). Here the plaintiff was present with
the actual permission of the owner but he was a mere guest in whose visit
the owner had no interest.
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license on the other persisted20 The ground of liability
to licensees in Maryland is often stated to be a "trap, or
something like fraud"." The fundamental distinction between harm caused to a licensee by the active conduct of a
possessor on the land, and harm arising out of the physical
condition of the land, while perhaps implicit in the Maryland cases, has not been applied. 2 Firemen, or members
of the salvage corps, are treated
as licensees and the gen33
eral Maryland rule applies.
The Court of Appeals, in recent cases involving the liability of a possessor of land, has cited with approval certain
sections of the Restatement of Torts.3 4 At the same time,
reliance is placed on the earlier Maryland cases, which employ a different terminology and classification than the Restatement; although their results are not in all instances
contrary to its conclusions. A recent case is interesting as
indicating a possible departure from the old classification
in favor of the Restatement's method of approach. In Recreation Centre Corp. v. Zimmerina*35 the plaintiff, a nonpaying spectator permissively present at the defendant's
bowling establishment, was injured, while descending a
stand of seats there provided for spectators, due to an abnormal drop from an aisle to one of the steps. The Court
of Appeals held that an invitation to use the stand might be
implied, and.said that although free spectators might be desired in such establishments for business advantages to the
proprietors, it was questionable under the evidence whether
the plaintiff could be considered as anything but a gratuitous licensee. The question involved was the legal sufficiency of the evidence and the Court found it unnecessary
to determine whether a proprietor's duty was the same toward all licensees, saying that toward a guest the proprietor
"The persistence of the classification of Chief Justice Bigelow may be
noted in Weidman v. Consol. Gas, Elec. L. & P. Co., 158 Md. 39, 148 A. 270
(1930). Cases such as Kalus v. Bass, 122 Md. 467, 472, 89 A. 731 (1914)
limit the invitation or inducement from common interest or mutual advantage of the visit along the lines previously mentioned. See note 21,
s upra.
Brinkmeyer v. United Iron & Metal Co., 168 Md. 149. 177 A. 171 (1935).
- This distinction is commonly referred to as the distinction between
active and passive negligence. That such a distinction exists in licensee
cases is noted in Burke v. Md., D. & Va. Ry. Co., supra n. 17, but the Court
preferred to adhere to the invitation doctrine. Cf. 49 A. L. R. 778 and
Restatement, Torts, Sec. 341 (this section cited in dictum in Beverly Beach
Club, Inc. v. Marron, 172 Md. 471, 192 A. 278 (1937).
13 Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925) ; cf. Restatement,
Torts, Sec. 345.
84 Consult the appropriate pages of The Restatenzent in The Courts (3rd
Ed.).
" 172 Md. 309, 191 A. 233 (1937).
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must take precautions to prevent injury on the accommodations provided from a danger known to the proprietor but
which, as he should realize, a guest exercising due care
might not perceive. Although the case may be reconciled
with previous decisions, it should be noted that while it is
said that an invitation might be implied, the plaintiff's position is considered to be that of a licensee to whom the proprietor was responsible, and, more importantly, the general
rule of liability to licensees as previously stated in the
Maryland decisions is not expressly stated.
It is not unnatural, in view of the history of the Maryland law with regard to the liability of landowners to those
on their premises, that the Court should refuse in the instant case to follow Section 334 of the Restatement of Torts.
The rule there announced is based upon the proposition
that society is primarily interested in the preservation free
from injury of its chief asset, the health and well being of
its members; while the decisions of our Court of Appeals
consider a landowner 's right to exclusive dominion over
his property as being of equal if not greater social desirability. In addition, where, as in the instant case, the landowner is making a use of his property which concerns the
public, the social value of that use must be considered.
This consideration seems to have been the controlling factor in the instant case. 6 There is much to be said for
each point of view and the final determination as to which
policy shall predominate is entirely a matter of opinion.
However, conceding, in the abstract, the force of the policy
adopted by the Court of Appeals, the particular application
of it to the alleged facts of the case is fairly open to criticism. It should be importantly noted that in essence the
complaint involved was that the railroad had allegedly
failed to comply with precautions it had voluntarily undertaken, presumably without interference with its duties as a
public carrier. When considered in this light, the argument of the Court in support of its position loses much
of its force.
The opinion also disappoints in two other respects.
First it fails to distinguish between users of longitudinal
a railroad's right of way at a
and those crossing
paths
Since paths along a railroad's right of
definite place
s8 See the quotation from Elliott on Railroads in the opinion of the Court,
3 A. (2d) 719, 722, and also the Court's discussion at page 724.
37 This distinction was involved in the recent case of Erie R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. d. 1188 (1938) ; and is
indirectly responsible for the abolition of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. 1. 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842).
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way may extend for a great distance, to impose a duty upon
the railroad to exercise care toward the users of such
paths results in a burden upon it greatly in excess of that
arising from the duty to exercise care toward those crossing the railroad at a definite point. Indeed, the section of
Elliott on Railroads quoted in part by the Court indicates
that the argument there advanced is3 intended
to be appli8
cable primarily to longitudinal paths.
Secondly, it ignores what was apparently an important
allegation in support of the plaintiff's point of view. As
has been previously stated the burden of the declaration
was that the precautions which were allegedly taken in
the past by the railroad were not observed at the time of
the injury. The portion of the declaration relating to this
point is summarized at the outset of the opinion, 89 yet the
statement is later made that "there is alleged no change in
the premises and its use".4O While the Court could be
expected to adopt the view that such a user of railroad
property would not be entitled to special protection, and
would have to use the path subject to the customary movement and operation of trains, the allegations as to the
failure to observe the precautions alleged to have been customarily taken in the past, might well be considered as a
distinguishing factor in this case sufficient to entitle them
to discussion.41 The case has drawn the criticism of42 another commentator on the basis of the policy adopted.
3 1Elliott on Railroads (3rd Ed.) Vol. 3. See. 1788. The Maryland
cases relied upon by the Court may be distinguished on the ground that,
unlike the present case, they did not involve the existence of definite
places of crossing in a populous community. Indeed, in P. W. & B. R. R.
Co. v. Fronk, 67 Md. 339, .347, 10 Ati. 204 (1887) the Court in a dictum
recognized that In Barry v. N. Y. C. & H. B. R. Co., supra n. 8, which was
practically identical In its facts with the instant case, there was sufficient evidence of negligence to be submitted to a jury.
393 A. (2d) 721 (Md. 1939).
403 A. (2d) 724 (Md. 1939).
41 To the effect that customary signals must be maintained, see 52 C. J.
230, Elliott, op. cit. 8upra n. 5. Compare Penna. R. Co. v. Yingling, 148
Md. 169, 177, 129 A. 36 (1925).
12 See Note (1939) .37 Mich. L. Rev. 1149-1150.

